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 1. The Cartesian conception of the mind 
 The subject of mental processes or mental states is usually assumed to be an indi-
vidual, and hence the boundaries of mental features – in a strict or metaphorical 
sense – are naturally regarded as reaching no further than the boundaries of the 
individual. This chapter addresses various philosophical developments in the 20th 
 and 21st century that questioned this natural assumption. I will frame this discus-
sion by fi rst presenting a historically infl uential commitment to the individualistic 
nature of the mental in Descartes’ theory. I identify various elements in the Carte-
sian conception of the mind that were subsequently criticized and rejected by vari-
ous externalist theories, advocates of the extended mind hypothesis and defenders 
of embodied cognition. Then I will indicate the main trends in these critiques. 
 Descartes’ work was partly a response to developments in natural science in 
the 17th century, and one of his goals was to provide a theoretical-philosophical 
foundation for modern science which rejected Aristotelian natural philosophy. 
Descartes was not the last philosopher who hoped to make a lasting contribution 
by providing a theory that integrates philosophy with modern science. Ever since 
the 17th century, there has been an occasionally reoccurring anxiety in philoso-
phy – famously expressed for example by Kant in the  Critique of Pure Reason – 
about the fact that while the sciences appear to make great progress, philosophy in 
comparison seems to make very little, if any progress. Various remedies have been 
suggested, for example by offering a methodology or grounding for philosophy 
that is either imported from the sciences, or is comparable to the objectivity and 
explanatory power of scientifi c method. This will be one of the persisting themes 
in this chapter. In section 2, we will see how the attempt to ground philosophi-
cal theories by semantics offers the hope of progress and questions the Cartesian 
boundaries of the mind at the same time. In section 3, we will see how naturalism 
about the mind also leads to reconsidering the issue of boundaries. 
 Descartes’ considerations about the nature of the mind in his Second Medita-
tion have had a profound effect on the development of philosophy in the Western 
tradition. 2 In the First Meditation, Descartes considers the possibility of being 
deceived by an evil demon. The starting point is the simple observation that things 
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can appear different from the way they are. Extending the gap between appear-
ance and reality to its extreme, it is possible, contends Descartes, that the world 
I take to be around me does not exist, that even my body does not exist, but all 
appearances of a world and my body are results of the manipulations of an evil 
demon. If I were the victim of the demon, things would appear exactly the same 
as they do now, but in reality, they would be very different. The modern version of 
this scenario of radical deception is usually known as the “brain-in-a-vat” or “the 
Matrix” scenario, where the stimuli arriving to our brain from external objects 
or the rest of our body are replaced by an elaborate machinery of virtual reality. 
 Even in this case of radical deception, Descartes argues, I would still be a think-
ing thing; moreover, a thinker who would have exactly the same mental features 
as I do now. The sky and earth may not exist, but I would still  believe they do; 
the light I seem to see and the noise I seem to hear may not be there, but I would 
still  feel that they are. Two points are worth emphasizing here. First, even though 
the demon scenario allows for the non-existence of my body, Descartes explicitly 
says that, at this point, he is still agnostic about the existence of a mind separable 
from the body. So the resulting conception is not committed to dualism about 
mind and body. Second, there is an important epistemic asymmetry between my 
mind and the rest of the world: namely, the possibility of being deceived by a 
demon, or being a brain in a vat, threatens, at least prima facie, my knowledge of 
the rest of the world, but it does not threaten my knowledge of the content of my 
mental states. This does not necessarily mean that I am omniscient or infallible 
about the nature of my mind; but it does mean that at least in  this comparison – 
i.e. vulnerability to a threat from the demon scenario – the mind fares  better than 
the body. The title of the Second Meditation is fi ttingly “The nature of the human 
mind, and how it is better known than the body”. 
 Eventually, by the end of the  Meditations , Descartes arrives at the conclusion 
that the mind is indeed distinct from the body. At the same time, Descartes was 
very interested in the body’s contribution to our mental life, and his view can be 
summarized (with some simplifi cation) as follows. There are mental phenomena, 
most notably, sensory (perceptual and bodily) experiences, and emotions, which 
are caused by the brain. Nerves from our sense-organs and throughout the body 
carry stimuli as far as the pineal gland in the brain. The gland has a distinctive 
state for each type of sensory or affective experience and causes our immaterial 
mind to undergo that experience. How this causal connection works between two 
entirely different substances is of course one of the greatest puzzles for a Cartesian 
dualist, but this is not the topic of this chapter (see  Chapters 2 and  7 ). It is more 
interesting for our purposes that apparently Descartes thought that non-sensory 
or non-affective cognition (for example, pure theoretical and practical reasoning) 
need not, or indeed could not, involve the body in such an intimate way ( Farkas 
2005). So there is a separation between what we may call “pure” cognition, on the 
one hand, and sensory and affective mental states, on the other. This separation, 
in itself, is not Descartes’ invention. Aristotle draws a similar distinction between 
rational and non-rational parts of the soul. 
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 I provide this sketch of Descartes’ conception of the mind because much of the 
following discussion will be usefully understood by the various critiques’ deep or 
superfi cial disagreement with certain elements of the Cartesian conception. In one 
way or another, many philosophers in the 20th and 21st century objected to the 
idea that a solitary mind deceived by an evil demon or evil scientist can have the 
same mental features as we do; or to the idea that the physical basis of mental phe-
nomena can be restricted to the brain; or to the idea that pure cognition is largely 
independent of the body. This chapter focuses on developments in the analytic 
philosophical tradition (for a critique of the Cartesian conception in continen-
tal philosophy, see, for example, Hubert Dreyfus’s commentary on Heidegger’s 
Being and Time ( Dreyfus 1991 ). I will not attempt to reconstruct all pros and cons 
in the debates I mention; for state-of-the-art summaries of these issues, it is worth 
consulting, for example, Lau and Deutsch ( Wilson and Foglia (2011). Instead, 
I shall try to trace some broad historical tendencies that infl uenced philosophical 
thinking on the boundaries of the mind. 
 2. “Externalism” or “anti-individualism” 
 2.1 The semantic tradition 
 Gottlob Frege is often identifi ed as one of the fi rst and most infl uential fi gures in 
the history of analytic philosophy. 3 Frege proposed the fi rst systematic modern 
theory of semantics, that is, a theory of how the semantic values (the truth and 
reference) of linguistic expressions are determined. Semantics and symbolic logic 
have then gone on to become two of the greatest success stories in the history 
of analytic philosophy, and no doubt this is the reason why Frege is regarded 
as one of the founders of the tradition, despite the fact that he was a German 
thinker, deeply rooted in a philosophical tradition that was quite different from the 
English-speaking empiricism that forms a more congenial historical background 
to analytic philosophy. I mentioned above the occasionally reoccurring anxiety 
in philosophy about the apparent lack of progress in the several thousand years’ 
history of the subject. Semantics and logic have been seen by many as fi nally 
offering the prospect for real progress in philosophy, not just in semantic theory 
itself, but also as a tool to get a better grip on a wide range of philosophical issues. 
We can fi nd a vigorous expression of this sentiment, for example, in Timothy Wil-
liamson’s 2004 paper “Must Do Better”. Williamson’s idea of progress in philoso-
phy is well expressed in these complimentary words about Michael Dummett’s 
contribution to the realism/anti-realism debate: 
 Instead of shouting slogans at each other, Dummett’s realist and anti-
realist would busy themselves in developing systematic compositional 
semantic theories of the appropriate type, which could then be judged 
and compared by something like scientifi c standards. 
 ( Williamson 2006, 179) 
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 In what we may call “the semantic tradition”, semantic theories and notions, like 
possible worlds, quantifi ers, operators, domains of quantifi cations, connectives, 
and so on, have shaped and still shape the understanding of an astonishing range 
of philosophical topics, including as diverse issues as ontological realism ( Chal-
mers et al. 2009 ), the analysis of knowledge and its relation to evidence ( Wil-
liamson 2000), the metaphysics of modality (Kripke 1972), the nature of belief 
and desire ( Richard 1990 ), the issue of cognitivism versus non-cognitivism in 
metaethics ( Schroeder 2010), and many more. 
 One of the basic instruments in a semantic theory is to attribute a certain feature 
to each linguistic expression which Frege called “sense”.  Sense determines refer-
ence (or semantic value in general) at least in that sameness of sense entails same-
ness of reference; this commitment is crucial, for the whole point of the theory 
is to identify a feature of expressions that accounts for their semantic values. 
Though this gives, in itself, very little idea of what “senses” are, it is prima facie 
plausible to identify sense with the meaning of a linguistic expression. Frege held 
that shared meaning is possible only if senses are neither mental nor physical, but 
rather belong to a third realm of beings to which thinking subjects have the same 
access. The default assumption in the subsequent history of semantics tended to 
follow this way of thinking in assuming that “propositions” (the senses of declara-
tive sentences) and “concepts” (the senses of sub-sentential expressions, the con-
stituent of propositions) are abstract entities. 
 Proper names pose a particular problem for the idea that expressions have 
a sense or a meaning which determines their reference. Saul Kripke’s  Naming 
and Necessity , published fi rst in 1972, was to become one of the most infl uen-
tial philosophical works of the 20th century, offering one of the best examples 
of how a focus on the semantic features of language can contribute to a whole 
range of philosophical problems, including metaphysics and the philosophy of 
mind. Kripke argued that names contribute their referent to complex expressions 
directly, without the mediation of senses. Hence what is expressed by names (the 
object it denotes) is often to be found outside thinking subjects. Kripke argued 
that similar considerations apply to natural kind terms denoting biological species 
or chemical kinds, like “gold” or “water” or “tiger”. 
 The sense/reference framework has another important consequence for names, 
indexicals and natural kind terms. Parallel to Kripke, Hilary Putnam developed in 
his papers in the seventies a theory of natural kind terms similar to the one presented 
in  Naming and Necessity . In his 1975 paper “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ ” (Putnam 
1975a), Putnam invites us to consider the consequences of this theory with the help 
of a thought experiment. Imagine a planet called Twin Earth which is an exact replica 
of Earth, with qualitatively identical counterparts of all Earthly inhabitants, including 
our protagonist, Oscar. The one difference between Earth and Twin Earth is that the 
liquid they call “water” is in fact a different chemical compound, and hence when 
Oscar and Twin Oscar talk about “water”, they refer to two different kinds. 
 A similar phenomenon arises in the case of names and indexical expressions. 
When Oscar and Twin Oscar use the name “Aristotle”, they refer to different 
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individuals: Oscar refers to Aristotle, and Twin Oscar to Twin Aristotle (as we 
would put it). Other infl uential cases – based also on expressions other than names 
and natural kind terms – are discussed in the work of Tyler Burge ( Burge 1979). For 
example, Burge presents two linguistic communities which use the word “arthritis” 
in slightly different ways, but focuses on two subjects, who have the same views on 
arthritis. These two subjects, just like Oscar and Twin Oscar, are internally identi-
cal, but refer to different things. As we saw, one option in the case of names is to 
say that they are directly referring expressions, without a sense. But suppose it’s 
implausible to say that some linguistic expressions which contribute to intelligent 
discourse are devoid of sense or meaning. Sense determines reference: sameness 
of sense entails sameness of reference, and hence difference of reference entails 
difference of sense. Therefore, the sense or meaning of “Aristotle” and “water” are 
different for Oscar and Twin Oscar (and similarly for Burge’s protagonists). 
 Many of our linguistic expressions refer to things outside us. Hence it is obvious 
that at least some semantic features, namely, the references of many expressions 
constitutively depend on things outside thinking subjects. This is uncontroversial. 
If meaning is to determine reference, and two internally identical subjects – like 
Oscar and Twin Oscar – can refer to different things, then it seems that meanings 
also have to depend on external factors. It is important to see that this conclusion 
need not depend essentially on the Kripke/Putnam theory of natural kinds, or on 
alleged intuitions about the reference of the term “water”. As long as we accept 
that two internally identical subjects can refer to different things by the use of 
names or indexicals (which is quite diffi cult to deny; indeed, we can stipulate 
such use of names), the requirement that sense determines reference entails that 
these subjects do not share their meanings either, despite their internal sameness. 
“Meanings ain’t in the head”, as Putnam famously declared. 
 2.2 The semantic conception of intentionality 
 The claim that  meanings are not in the head is perhaps not that surprising after all. 
For example, it should be fairly uncontroversial that linguistic meaning depends 
on things outside an individual, namely on linguistic conventions being accepted 
by others in her linguistic community. Or it could depend on abstract senses that 
exist in the third realm beyond mental and physical beings. What about the idea 
that certain semantic features – other than reference – in my idiolect depend on 
things outside me? Even that is less than shocking. Semantic theories usually offer 
models which often include inevitable simplifi cations – this is especially true of 
formal semantic theories. All sorts of things can model all sorts of things. We can 
start with a model where the sense of a sentence is an ordered n-tuple of the senses 
of its constituents. Then we could be persuaded that names refer directly, without 
the mediation of a sense, and propose instead that the sense of sentences contain-
ing names should be modeled by an n-tuple that includes the reference, rather than 
the sense of the name. The point I want to stress is that in a way, this move is easy: 
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n-tuples, whether consisting “senses” or “references” can serve as good models; 
their usefulness will depend on the explanatory power of the model. 
 Putnam formulated the original claim about meanings, but the thesis assumed 
its real signifi cance and became relevant to our current topic when it was broad-
ened to include mental contents. One of the fi rst to make this move was Tyler 
Burge ( Burge 1979). 4 The general argument could proceed as follows. We start 
with noting that mental states like beliefs, or entertained thoughts, can be true or 
false. Moreover, not only beliefs, but also desires, perceptual experiences, certain 
emotions, and other mental states are  about things in the world: they exhibit inten-
tionality, or the mind’s direction upon objects (see  Chapter 8 on Intentionality). 
The next, crucial move is to understand intentional directedness on the analogy 
of semantic reference. This is not implausible: a belief is about things, which also 
serve as referents of expressions we use to express the belief. We might think that 
fundamentally the same idea is involved when a word refers to a thing, or an idea 
is about the same thing. This move offers the possibility of importing the concep-
tual tools of semantic theory into understanding the nature of mental states: we 
attribute a semantic content to a belief which is the same as the semantic content 
of the sentence we use to express the belief. 
 The semantic content of sentences, hence of beliefs, is nothing other than the 
sense or meaning of a sentence. We already know that meaning is outside the 
head: so the content of beliefs is also outside the head. Similar considerations will 
apply to other instances of intentional directedness. Hence some mental features 
are constitutively determined by things outside a thinking subject. This is the view 
known as  externalism or  anti-individualism about mental content, and it entails 
the rejection of the  internalist Cartesian conception of the mind sketched in sec-
tion 1. A solitary brain-in-a-vat or a subject deceived by an evil demon cannot 
have all the same mental states as we have, if the objects to which we refer don’t 
exist in their world. Eliminating the world outside does not leave the inner world 
of thought intact, as Descartes believed. If we want thought to be about the world, 
then even what it is  possible to think will depend on how things are external to us. 
 Lines of resistance to the externalist conclusion open accordingly. The require-
ment that sense determines reference leads to the externalist conclusion only if 
we assume that sense alone determines reference; for if sense plus something 
else determines reference, then from different references we cannot infer differ-
ent senses ( Farkas 2008 , ch.7). Starting from the 2000s, there has been an intense 
debate in semantics about the role of context in determining truth-value (see  Preyer 
and Peter 2007 for a representative cross-section of the debate), and a number of 
theories were developed which give up the principle that sense alone determines 
reference ( MacFarlane 2005 ). Thus one could retain the semantic conception of 
intentionality and still resist the externalist conclusion. Alternatively, one could 
begin to question the idea that intentional directedness should be understood on 
the model of semantic reference ( Crane 2014). 
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 2.3 Two-dimensional views 
 A semantic theory is a theory of how the semantic value (truth, reference) of 
expressions is determined. The feature of expressions that determines their refer-
ence is variously called “meaning” or “sense” or “content”. Some philosophers 
have suggested that meanings or contents have two different aspects that can-
not be explained by a single notion. Just as in the case of semantic externalism, 
these “two-dimensional semantic theories” or “dual content theories” can be put 
forward about meanings (and, in this case, also about types of necessity), rather 
than about the mind.  Chalmers (2006) gives a thorough overview of the various 
versions of this “two-dimensional” approach to contents. 
 David Kaplan, who is often regarded as the fi rst to present a systematic two-
dimensional framework ( Kaplan 1977 ), distinguished between the character and 
the content of indexical expressions. On this view, the character remains constant 
for each use of the fi rst person pronoun “I”, and it expresses something like “the 
speaker of this utterance”. However, the contents expressed by fi rst-person sen-
tences are different for different speakers: they are singular propositions which 
constitutively contain the subject of the utterance. Kaplan considers a Putnam-like 
scenario of Castor and Pollux, identical twins who are stipulated to have qualita-
tively identical internal states. Kaplan holds that the cognitive or psychological 
states (he uses the terms interchangeably) of the twins are exactly the same, even 
though they express different singular propositions when each says “My brother 
was born before me” ( Kaplan 1977, 535). Kaplan follows Putnam’s original for-
mulation the lesson of the Twin Earth story: semantics contents do, but psycho-
logical states don’t determine reference. As mentioned before, this is a type of 
externalism, but not externalism about the mind. 
 Just like in the case of the Twin Earth story, the two-dimensional framework 
was subsequently modifi ed, so that both dimensions were brought into the men-
tal realm. The idea is that internally identical subjects in different environments 
(like Castor and Pollux, or Oscar and Twin Oscar, or me and my brain-in-a-vat 
counterpart) are similar in some mental respect, but different in another. For each 
pair, their mental states share their “narrow” contents, but differ in some of their 
“broad” contents ( Fodor 1987). 
 The two-dimensional view has been seen by many as a judicious compromise 
between externalist and internalist views ( Chalmers 2002). The broad content of 
mental states accounts for some of our practices in attributing mental states. For 
example, if we say that Castor and Pollux believe different things when they each 
think that “My brother was born before me”, it is tempting to say that the differ-
ence in beliefs is a mental difference. At the same time, we can see why Kaplan 
was inclined to say that the twins are psychologically alike. If Castor and Pollux 
are both convinced that they are second-born, this may prompt similar actions. 
When we think about how the world appears from the subjective point of view, 
or how to explain actions in terms of the subject’s mental states, it is tempting to 
discover mental  similarities among internally identical agents. 
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 Two-dimensional views, therefore, do not see broad and narrow features in 
competition: both contents can be attributed to the same mental state, for differ-
ent purposes. However, someone could raise the following worry. When I con-
sciously think to myself that “Water is wet” or “My brother was born before me”, 
it does not seem at all that I am entertaining two thoughts on each occasion, with 
two different contents. With each conscious act of thinking, there seems to be 
only one thing that I grasp. So it is not very clear how the two different contents 
are present in my mind. One natural answer on behalf of the two-dimensional 
theory is to return to the observation, made earlier, that the semantic approach to 
mental content provides  models , where operations on a structure of abstract enti-
ties model some or other function that contents are supposed to do – determine 
reference, or explain action, as the case may be. Mental contents can be modeled 
by sets of possible worlds, centered world, diagonal propositions, and so on, and 
the theory need not make a claim on the experienced reality of our mental life. 
 2.4 The extent of inner space 
 So far we have seen externalist theories which handle the issue of mental con-
tent through what we could broadly describe as the “modeling approach”. In 
this section, we shall look at a rather different externalist view, defended in the 
works of Gareth Evans ( Evans 1982) and John McDowell, which addresses the 
phenomenological-psychological reality of content.  I shall use McDowell’s  1986 
paper “Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space” as a representative of this 
approach, since it explicitly tackles the issue of the boundaries of the mind. 
 McDowell’s target in this paper is what he calls the “fully Cartesian” picture 
of the mind. On this picture, the mental realm is what is left after entertaining the 
possibility of radical deception, and consists of transparently accessible and infal-
libly known facts. Privileged access to the inner realm makes access to the rest 
of the world correspondingly problematic, opening a gap between the inner and 
outer world that is very diffi cult to bridge. The Cartesian conception puts “sub-
jectivity’s very possession of an objective environment in question” ( McDowell 
1986, 237). On McDowell’s view, this is not simply the epistemological anxiety 
about the possible non-existence or radical different nature of the world; rather, 
the threat is that we cannot explain how thinking about a mind-independent world 
is so much as possible. 
 McDowell’s answer is based on transforming Bertrand Russell’ s notion of 
acquaintance ( Russell 1917). Acquaintance is an epistemic-psychological rela-
tion in which we stand to objects when we are directly aware of them, without an 
intermediary process of inference or knowledge of truths. When a particular is an 
object of acquaintance, it is a constituent of the singular proposition that forms 
the content of a judgment. McDowell makes it clear that, for Russell, unlike, for 
example, for Kaplan, singular propositions are not merely part of semantics, but 
they are intended as a “distinctive kind of confi guration in psychological real-
ity” ( McDowell 1986, 228). However, for Russell, the psychological reality of 
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singular propositions comes with a serious restriction on the range of objects that 
can enter into such propositions. Suppose – as McDowell himself would subse-
quently propose – that we allow external objects to be objects of acquaintance, 
and constituents of singular propositions. Since we can be mistaken about the 
presence of an external object, this move would open the possibility of an  illusion 
of entertaining a singular proposition. This was unacceptable for Russell. 
 We can regain possession of the world if we allow that some of our mental 
states constitutively involve external objects, and thus “we are compelled to pic-
ture the inner and outer realms as interpenetrating, not separated from one another 
by the characteristically Cartesian divide” ( McDowell 1986, 241). Some of the 
object-involving states are subjectively indistinguishable from states which do 
not involve objects, for example in a veridical perception and the matching perfect 
hallucination. On the fully Cartesian conception, the mental nature of subjectively 
indistinguishable states must be the same; otherwise we could mistake one mental 
state for another. McDowell wants to resist this move by giving up the claim that 
we are infallible about all aspects of mental states, and he accepts that mental 
states of very different nature can give rise to the same appearance: 
 Short of the fully Cartesian picture, the infallibly knowable fact – its 
seeming to one that things are thus and so – can be taken disjunctively, 
as constituted either by the fact that things are manifestly thus and so or 
by the fact that that merely seems to be the case. 
 ( McDowell 1986, 242) 
 McDowell, like many others infl uenced by Oxford philosophy in the second half 
of the 20th century, can be seen as responding to a question raised prominently 
in P. F. Strawson’s work: how can we explain the very idea of a subject possess-
ing the experience of an objective environment ( Strawson 1959,  Chapter 2 ). One 
area where the question received an especially great amount of attention was per-
ception. It seems a fundamental phenomenological fact about perception that it 
appears to present a mind-independent world. How is this possible? In the empiri-
cist tradition, it was customary to view perceptual experiences as sensations, that 
is, as modifi cations of a subject’s consciousness – but this leaves the fundamental 
phenomenological fact unexplained. 
 The “disjunctive” theory of perception was developed from the 1980s partly to 
answer this challenge (see also  Chapter 4 , Theories of Perception). The basic idea 
is hinted in the quote from McDowell ( McDowell 1986, 242) : when something 
appears to be the case, it could  either an object-involving fact manifesting itself in 
experience,  or an indistinguishable mere appearance – hence the name “disjunc-
tivism”. The fact that some experiences constitutively involve an external object 
is meant to explain how we can make sense of the idea that perception presents a 
mind-independent world. 5 The important point for our purposes is that the mental 
nature of object-involving and non-object involving experiences are radically dif-
ferent, and this difference is due to facts external to the subject: the presence or 
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absence of an object of perception. Disjunctivism and the relational views about 
experience are therefore forms of externalism about mental features. 
 Though Evans and McDowell have been as deeply infl uenced by the semantic 
theories of Frege and Russell as many of the externalist philosophers previously 
mentioned, their approach to the mind is somewhat different from those we placed 
in the “semantic tradition”. It does not seem that they are attempting to offer 
models for various possible functions of mental features. Instead, they take as a 
starting point, and as psychologically real, the phenomenologically fundamental 
features of our thinking and experience: for example, the fact that we seem to be 
in possession of a conception of an objective world. Perhaps relatedly, McDowell 
has little interest in a scientistic conception of the mind. On the contrary, one 
of his main inspirations is Wilfrid Sellars’s idea that a proper understanding of 
the mind is not possible in a merely causal-naturalistic explanatory framework 
( McDowell 1994). Hence the type of externalism that is motivated by the kind 
of considerations Evans and McDowell put forward does not fi t into either of the 
broad trends we describe in this chapter: the modeling approaches presented in 
sections 2.1–2.3, or the naturalistic theories of section 3. 
 2.5 The boundaries of privileged access 
 According to externalists, Descartes was wrong in claiming that internally identi-
cal subjects always have the same mental features. It’s been argued that this entails 
that Descartes was also wrong in claiming an epistemic privilege to the mental 
realm (see  Brown 2004 for various aspects of the debate). More precisely, com-
pared to internalism, externalism limits – according to this argument – the scope 
of privileged fi rst-person knowledge of mental features. Indeed, it was claimed 
( Farkas 2008) that the restriction of privileged access is not a consequence, but 
rather a defi ning feature of externalist views. Arguably, this attitude was discern-
ible, for example, in McDowell’s considerations quoted in section 2.4: McDowell 
identifi es the privileged epistemic status of mental facts as the central tenet of the 
fully Cartesian picture, and argues that by giving up this claim, we open the way 
towards making some of the external world constitutive of our mental states. 6 
 It is interesting to mention here another infl uential view on the limitations of 
self-knowledge, represented in the work of Sigmund Freud. The two views are of 
course very different both in their theses and their motivations. But they can be 
both seen as undermining a central tenet of the Cartesian conception of the mind: 
in a manner of speaking, while externalists want to extend the boundary outwards, 
Freud suggested that the boundaries of the mind lie much deeper than the shallow 
heights reached by straightforward refl ective awareness. This is the realm of the 
unconscious. 
 We have not addressed Freud in this chapter because Freud and psychoanaly-
sis have had remarkably little effect on mainstream analytic philosophy, com-
pared, for example, to continental philosophy, where Freud had much more of an 
infl uence, and compared to the rest of intellectual life and culture. 7 Unconscious 
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mental states are the subject of much theorizing in analytic philosophy of mind, 
but the disciplines that analytic philosophers consult about these states are either 
cognitive psychology (for example, in studying the sub-personal states involved 
in learning or perceptual processes), or social psychology (for studying phenom-
ena like implicit bias). Nonetheless, the broad infl uence of Freud’s ideas probably 
contributed to undermining the Cartesian conception which is the main target of 
externalist views popular in the analytic philosophical tradition and which is also 
a target of many naturalist views of the mind discussed in the next section. 
 3. Naturalism about the mind 
 3.1 The functionalist-computationalist view 
 In Descartes’ time, a philosopher interested in the study of the mind freely 
included anatomical, psychological, and biological considerations in his works. 
As with many other disciplines, the various sciences of the mind have subse-
quently become autonomous and separate from philosophy. Yet developments in 
the sciences continued to exercise a profound effect on philosophy, and this is 
especially apparent in analytic philosophy of mind in the 20th century. I have 
already alluded to the recurrent desire to place philosophy on a secure method-
ology that would offer a chance of progress comparable to progress in science. 
There have been two further, distinguishable, though often co-existent, manifesta-
tions of this impact. 
 The fi rst is the doctrine of naturalism or physicalism. In the fi rst half of the 20th 
century, especially after the development of the theories of relativity and quantum 
mechanics, it seemed that physics could offer an explanation of the world that was 
unparalleled in scope, depth, evidence, and explanatory power. The other natural 
sciences, even if not obviously reducible to physics, have links to physics that 
promised a unifi ed theory of the world. This inspired a physicalist-naturalist pro-
gram: aiming at an account of all mental phenomena that is compatible with the 
thesis that everything that exists fi gures in the theories of natural sciences. Though 
materialism was a notable philosophical position already in ancient philosophy, 
and from the 17th century onwards, it is characteristic of philosophy of mind 
in the second half of the 20th century that physicalism (both for defenders and 
opponents) dominated the agenda in a way it never had before (see  Chapters 2 ,  3 , 
 7 in this volume). 
 The second impact of the sciences is an increased interest in philosophy to 
approach the study of the mind from an interdisciplinary standpoint. This means 
actively trying to fi gure out how empirical results in psychology, evolutionary 
theory, or neuroscience may affect our philosophical theories of the mind. The 
two approaches are compatible, but independent: one could believe in a natural-
ist ontology but still rely mainly on the (broadly speaking) speculative methods 
of philosophy and not pay much attention to empirical work. 8 Or someone could 
reject a physicalist or naturalist ontology (together with a somewhat surprising 
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number of natural scientists), 9 yet invest a lot of time in empirical studies of the 
mind in the hope that they illuminate our philosophical theories. 
 Starting in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the 20th century witnessed the devel-
opment of a robust and sophisticated defense of a naturalist conception of the 
mind, and the emergence of cognitive science, an interdisciplinary approach to the 
workings of the mind (see  Chapter 11 , the Rise of Cognitive Science). One promi-
nent idea both in naturalist theories and in cognitive science is that the mind could 
be understood on the analogy of computers (inspired by Turing’s groundbreak-
ing work for example in Turing  1950). 10 According to the classic functionalist-
computational picture of the mind, our core cognitive processes can be under-
stood as programs that manipulate certain representations stored in the brain. The 
central computing unit is connected to the periphery in two ways: our nervous 
system transduces stimuli that arrive from the world to our sensory organs, and 
also conveys certain tasks to be solved (for example by signaling that the body 
needs nutrition). The information arriving to the central system is used to build an 
inner representation of the world, which then helps the system to solve the tasks 
posed for it (for example, by computing the navigations needed to reach food). 
The solutions are then translated to action commands, which are communicated 
to another component of the periphery, the motor system (the result being that the 
organism moves towards the source of food). 
 One crucial point here is that in this so-called “sense-think-act cycle”, the cen-
tral thinking module, which is sandwiched between the periphery of perception 
and action, is conceived as running a highly abstract program; that is, a program 
that can be realized by very different physical mechanisms, and would be, in 
principle, compatible with a large variety of inputs and outputs, fashioned for all 
sorts of sensory organs and all sorts of bodies to be moved. This idea actually has 
very old roots: we saw a similar conception being present already in Aristotle and 
Descartes, in the view that pure cognition is independent both of the body, and the 
sensory-affective aspect of our mental life. 
 Descartes thought that everything material must work on mechanistic principles, 
and he simply could not imagine how a programmed mechanism could account 
for the creativity of human thought. Therefore, he held that the immaterial soul 
must be the home for rational cognition. Descartes’ argument is based on some 
empirical-scientifi c assumptions that are clearly superseded today. As we shall 
see in section 3.4, the classic computationalist picture has come under increased 
criticism. But even if the picture needs correction, we should not underestimate 
the signifi cance of having a conception of mental processes, the computational-
functionalist conception, which makes sense – in a way that’s completely consist-
ent with a naturalist world-view – of something that completely baffl ed Descartes 
and others for centuries (see  Rey 1997,  Chapter 2 ). 
 There are at least three boundary issues raised by naturalism and the functionalist-
computational theory of the mind. First, naturalist accounts of representations 
usually rely on an external individuation of mental content. Second, functionalism 
about the mind has the possible consequence that the physical basis of the mind 
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extends beyond the boundaries of our organic body. Third, the classical compu-
tational conception was criticized for not taking into account the essential role of 
the “periphery” in cognitive processes. The resulting views – externalism about 
content, the extended mind hypothesis, and various versions of embodied cogni-
tion – assert the dependence of the mind on things outside the brain or the subject 
in rather different ways. I shall explain each of them in turn. 
 3.2 Naturalist reduction of content 
 Jerry Fodor has developed one of the most powerful and sophisticated defenses of 
the computational theory of the mind, through his landmark publications starting 
in the 1970s ( Fodor 1975 ;  1987). Part of this project is to account for the fact that 
mental states seem to be about things in the world (see  Chapter 8 , Intentionality). 
As Fodor famously put it: 
 I suppose sooner or later the physicists will complete the catalogue 
they’ve been compiling of the ultimate and irreducible properties of 
things. When they do, the likes of  spin ,  charm , and  charge will perhaps 
appear on their list. But  aboutness surely won’t: intentionality simply 
doesn’t go that deep. 
 ( Fodor 1987, 97) 
 Aboutness in the computational theory of mind is approached through the notion 
of representation. The basis of the analogy with computer programs is that certain 
symbols, called “representations” are stored in the brain, and the machine – the 
mind, the brain – manipulates these symbols on the basis of their physical shapes 
(that is the only kind of feature detectable by a physical symbol-manipulator). The 
symbols represent various items in our environment, and this makes it possible 
for us to think and reason about them. If I believe that cats like cream, and I want 
give my cat a treat, I will decide to get some cream for him. But what makes it 
the case that a certain thought, realized by a symbol in the brain, represents cats, 
rather than, say, dogs? One plausible answer from a physicalist point of view is 
that there is some sort of causal or nomological connection between the presence 
of things in the world, and the presence of the representation. The crudest form 
of this would be the following: seeing a cat causes a certain brain-state which, in 
virtue of being caused by a cat, represents cats (or this particular cat). This very 
crude version is unsatisfactory, partly because it cannot account for misrepresen-
tation: if all tokenings represent their causes, no tokening will ever be mistaken. 
Accounts that try to base representation on some sort of lawful connections or 
evolved functions face better prospects. 
 On a nomological account ( Fodor 1987), symbols represent things whose pres-
ence has a lawful correlation with the symbol. This account can employ a certain 
version of the two-dimensional framework mentioned in section 2.3. Computations 
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on symbols in the brain can explain one part of cognition and the narrow aspect of 
content; the lawful connections with the world can explain the broad aspect. 
 The Twin Earth scenario illustrates the consequences of the nomological view 
for the individuation of content. Oscar’s “water” representations are nomologi-
cally correlated with the presence of H2O, Twin Oscar’s “water” representations 
with the presence of XYZ. The content of their representations are different. The 
nomological view entails externalism about content as it was defi ned in section 2. 
An even more emphatic illustration of this comes from considering a certain ver-
sion of the brain-in-a-vat scenario. In the virtual reality of brains-in-vats, presum-
ably some complex part of the computer program is responsible for the tokening 
of representations in the brains, hence these are the prime candidates for stand-
ing in a lawful correlation with the presence of representations in the brain. The 
somewhat surprising conclusion is that brains-in-vats have actually mostly true 
beliefs about the world: since they represent bits of the computer program, and 
their world does consist of bits of the computer program, they are mostly right. 
 Starting in the 1980s, several authors ( Dretske 1981 ;  Millikan 1984 ;  Papineau 
1987 ) proposed alternative naturalist-reductive theories which analyze represen-
tation in terms of evolved functions. These views also entail externalism: if we 
imagined an artifi cial or accidentally created replica of a human being, her repre-
sentational states would be different, since they would lack an evolutionary his-
tory ( Davidson 1987). Naturalist theories are therefore usually committed to some 
form of externalism about mental content. 
 3.3 Extended mind 
 Most naturalist-physicalist theories of the mind rely on some version of function-
alism, broadly understood. Central to this conception is the idea that what makes 
something a particular mental state depends on the role it plays in a cognitive 
system, but not on the physical constitution of the piece of machinery that realizes 
this role. This multiple realizability is often illustrated by stating that a certain 
belief or desire, or feeling pain, can be realized by neural states of quite different 
character in different species of animals, and possibly even by a creature who is 
made of inorganic material – as long as there is an isomorphism in the functional 
role the state plays in a larger system ( Putnam 1960). 
 This raises the question of how much liberty we can take with the realization of 
functional roles. Andy Clark and David Chalmers proposed the following thought 
experiment ( Clark and Chalmers 1998). Inga is an ordinary person who lives in 
New York and wants to visit the Museum of Modern Art. She recalls that the 
museum is on 53rd Street and sets off. Contrast her case with that of Otto, who 
suffers from long-term memory loss, and therefore enters all important informa-
tion into a notebook that he carries with him and consults all the time. When Otto 
wants to visit the Museum of Modern Art, he looks up the address in his notebook, 
and sets off. 
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 It is usually agreed that Inga has the belief that the museum is on 53rd Street 
even prior to recalling this information. On a functionalist theory, this state is 
defi ned in terms of having a certain functional role in Inga’s cognitive system: tak-
ing into account her other mental states (for example a desire to visit a museum), 
it responds to certain inputs with certain outputs (for example setting off towards 
the museum). Clark and Chalmers argue that the information stored in Otto’s note-
book has exactly the same role in Otto’s cognitive system, and therefore we should 
attribute the same belief to Otto, even before he consults his notebook. The fact that 
the notebook is to be found outside Otto’s organic body is irrelevant here. Clark 
and Chalmers offer the following general consideration to support their claim: 
 If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process 
which,  were it done in the head , we would have no hesitation in recog-
nizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so 
we claim) part of the cognitive process. 
 ( Clark and Chalmers 1998, 8) 
 The principle has subsequently become known as “the Parity Principle”, and it is 
a consequence of a functionalist view of mental states. It is instructive to compare 
Otto and Inga with Ned Block’s famous example in which he imagines the popu-
lation of China realizing a system that is functionally equivalent to Block’s brain: 
such a system would arguably lack mental states altogether, hence, Block argued, 
there has to be more to mentality than playing a functional role ( Block 1980). But, 
unlike the Chinese network, both Inga and Otto are  bona fi de cognitive agents 
with mental states, so it makes perfectly good sense to ask whether they possess 
a particular mental state (ie. the belief that the museum is on 53rd Street) or not. 
 If functionalism is correct, this translates to the question of whether any state 
plays the appropriate role in their cognitive system. Functionalism asks us to 
disregard physical realization, for example the difference between brain tissue 
and pages of a notebook. Moreover, as Mark Sprevak has convincingly argued 
( Sprevak 2009 ), the spirit of functionalism also asks us to disregard the micro-
functional differences that undoubtedly exist between Inga’s and Otto’s access to 
the relevant information. The macro-functional roles of the information stored in 
Inga’s relevant brain-state and Otto’s notebook are arguably the same. Therefore 
it seems we have to conclude that Otto also has the belief that the museum is 
on 53rd Street. The argument extends to any type of mental state which can be 
plausibly accounted for in terms of functional roles: for example, standing states 
like intentions or desires. It is less obvious whether, or how, the argument extends 
to episodes in the stream of consciousness whose identity arguably depends on 
their conscious or phenomenal character. Both Clark and Chalmers are inclined 
to think that consciousness does not extend in the way standing mental states do 
( Chalmers 2008 ;  Clark 2010). 11 
 The term “extended mind” suggests that the notebook is actually part of Otto’s 
mind, or, put in more functionalist terms, the notebook is part of the physical 
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reality that serves as a realizer for the functional states we attribute to Otto. This 
seems to be a dependence on things outside the subject that is different from the 
dependence in externalist theories discussed in section 2. We will return to this 
question in section 4.1. 
 3.4 Embodied cognition 
 The topic of “embodied” or “situated” cognition has received a lot of attention 
in cognitive science starting in the 1990s. The debates we have discussed so far 
have, by and large, been directly motivated by questions arising within philoso-
phy: about the nature of intentionality, the proper account of representation, the 
philosophical theory of perception, the mind-body problem. In contrast, much of 
the historical and current background for discussing embodied cognition is found 
outside the usual disciplinary boundaries of philosophy. Part of the task of phi-
losophers in this debate is, and has been, to distill the philosophical signifi cance 
of certain ideas coming from the more empirical disciplines. 
 Robert Wilson and Lucia Foglia (2011) identify several key historical infl uences 
on the formation of embodied cognitive science, including three books that they 
regard as the fi rst landmark publications in the area. In  Metaphors We Live By , 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson argued that many central cognitive processes 
are infl uenced by the use of metaphors, which, in turn, are deeply infl uenced 
by the kind of bodies human beings have and use in interacting with the world 
( Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Francisco Varela, in his book  The Embodied Mind , 
co-authored with Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch, proposed an “enactive” 
program for cognitive science that questions “the assumption . . . that cognition 
consists of the representation of a world that is independent of our perceptual and 
cognitive capacities by a cognitive system that exists independent of the world” 
( Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991, xx) Instead, cognitive structures emerge 
from the organism ’s interaction with the world: from the way sensory stimula-
tion systematically changes as organisms and objects move (called “sensorimotor 
patterns” or “sensorimotor dependencies”). By using the term “embodied”, the 
authors aim to highlight “fi rst, that cognition depends upon the kinds of experi-
ence that come from having a body with various sensorimotor capacities, and sec-
ond, that these individual sensorimotor capacities are themselves embedded in a 
more encompassing biological, psychological, and cultural context” ( Varela et al. 
1991, 173–174). As the quote also makes it clear, the scope of this thesis – unlike 
the extended mind thesis of the precious section – is meant to include conscious 
experiences, as well as standing states like beliefs. 12 
 Continuing the list of key infl uences on embodied cognitive science, in robot-
ics, Rodney Brooks ( Brooks 1991a ;  1991b) reported successful work in build-
ing robots based on a view of computational intelligence whic h did not rely on 
“independent information processing units which must interface with each other 
via representations. Instead, the intelligent system is decomposed into inde-
pendent and parallel activity producers which all interface directly to the world 
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through perception and action” ( Brooks 1991a , 139). Brooks’s insights feature 
prominently in Andy  Clark’s 1997  Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World 
Together Again . Further historical infl uences mentioned by Wilson and Foglia 
include James Gibson’s ecological view of perception (Gibson 1979), work on 
dynamical systems, and the dynamicist theory of cognitive development (Thelen 
and Smith 1994). Finally, a somewhat unexpected source of inspiration is to be 
found in the phenomenological philosophical tradition of the fi rst part of the 20th 
century; in particular in the works of Husserl, Sartre, Heidegger, and Merleau-
Ponty (see  Chapter 1 , The Phenomenological Tradition). 
 As these summaries of the origins of the embodied conception already indi-
cate, the ideas coming together under the label of “embodied cognition” are rather 
diverse, and there isn’t one single and specifi c thesis that represents the move-
ment. We will now touch upon some of its central themes. 
 One dominant motif is a phenomenological refl ection on mind and cognition, 
prominent in the works of philosophers like Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger. Phe-
nomenologists point out that our view of the world is formed in close, and often 
unrefl ective, active interactions with things in the world, and those interactions, 
in turn, are essentially shaped by the nature of our body and sensory system. The 
resulting view is often styled as “anti-Cartesian”, but it is instructive to see how it 
relates exactly to Descartes’ actual views. Undoubtedly, this picture has a differ-
ent fl avor than the highly refl exive, contemplative, and abstract viewpoint that is 
often felt to be advocated by Descartes. There are many more, often metaphorical 
statements that aim to illustrate this contrast between “involvement” and “detach-
ment”, for example in the claim that once we get phenomenology right, we realize 
“that to perceive is to be in an interactive relationship with the world, not to be in 
an internal state that happens to be caused by the external world” ( Cosmelli and 
Thompson 2011, 165). Arguably, many of these contrasts reveal an important dif-
ference in emphasis, but they hardly amount to serious doctrinal differences. After 
all, an interactive relationship is perfectly compatible with the idea that we have 
internal states caused by the world. 
 Second, though Descartes believed that the mind is an immaterial substance 
separable from the body, he fully acknowledged that as far as  actual human psy-
chology goes, sense-experience and the involvement of the body are crucial ele-
ments. “I am not merely present in my body as a sailor is present in a ship” 
( Descartes 1984, vol.2, 81), Descartes famously remarked. 
 As I mentioned in section 1, Descartes also had a partly empirical hypothesis 
about the role of the body in different mental processes. He thought that while 
brain states serve as proximal causes for sensory and affective mental states, the 
brain is not involved in pure thinking; instead, thinking takes place in the imma-
terial soul. Very few people today accept the existence of Cartesian immaterial 
substances, but it has been argued that the sharp Cartesian divide between pure 
thinking and the rest of mental phenomena survives in functionalist theories. As 
described in section 3.1, these theories hold that paradigmatic forms of cogni-
tion consist of centrally executed operations on highly abstract representations, 
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sandwiched, but only contingently, between the input of a sensory system and the 
output to a motor system. A number of fi ndings about the nature of cognition have 
been thought to undermine the classical computational picture. 
 Margaret Wilson (2002) provides a useful overview of some of these fi ndings. 
First, cognition is situated: we often carry out cognitive tasks while perceptual 
information keeps coming in, and action is performed with a possible impact on 
the environment, both of which continuously modify the task at hand. Second, 
cognition is often under time-pressure that prevents building an abstract internal 
model of the world. Third, we off-load cognitive work on our body and on the 
environment: rotating the shapes in Tetris on the screen rather than in our head, we 
share the burden of holding and manipulating information with our environment. 
Fourth, much of cognition is directly for action, rather than for representation. 
All these ideas put considerable pressure on the claim that cognition is realized 
exclusively or even mainly by the kind of processes that fi gure in the classical 
computational view. 
 4. Varieties of “externalism” 
 4.1 Different conceptions of boundaries 
 The views presented so far all concern the boundaries of the mind in some sense. 
In this section, I will briefl y compare these different senses. Susan Hurley distin-
guished between “what” and “how” externalism ( Hurley 2010 ). “What” external-
ist theories (which include the theories we discussed in section 2) claim that some 
personal-level mental features – for example, content or phenomenal quality – are 
explained by external factors. Extended and embodied views belong to “how” 
externalism, on which external features “explain how the processes or mecha-
nisms work that enable mental states” of specifi c types ( Hurley 2010 , 101). In ear-
lier work ( Hurley 1998), Hurley called how-externalism “vehicle” externalism, 
because it involves claims about the realizers or vehicles of mental states. In con-
trast, externalists of section 2 hold that we individuate certain mental states partly 
by their relations to their intentional objects – but this view need not say anything 
about vehicles. (I have refrained from calling embodied and embedded views 
“externalist”, reserving this term only for what Hurley calls “what-externalism”.) 
 Further differences between the come to light if we consider the brain-in-a-vat 
scenario. In his review of Alva Noë’s book  Action in Perception , Ned Block illus-
trates his disagreement with Noë’s enactive approach (which is a type of embod-
ied view, on our classifi cation) by speculating about a solitary brain-in-a-vat who, 
through an unlikely but not impossible chance fl uctuation of particles, comes to 
existence in exactly the same physical state as the brain of an embodied human 
being ( Block 2005). Block takes Noë to hold that the brain would not have the 
same experience as its embodied counterpart, and he argues that this is is implau-
sible, because the body and the environment are merely causes of the experience, 
but not constitutive parts of the realizer of the experience. 13 
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 Block claims supervenience on the brain specifi cally for  experiences , but 
not for all mental states. Though he is an internalist about experience, like the 
majority of philosophers of mind, he is an externalist about mental contents (the 
issue of extended mind is not addressed in the review). This way of present-
ing the matter suggests that all the different debates discussed in this chapter 
can be formulated in terms of which mental features do or do not supervene 
the brain or the body.  However,  Evan Thompson and Diego Cosmelli (2011) 
argued that setting up the opposition this way doesn’t get to the heart of the 
enactive-embodied approach. Their interest is not the purely philosophical ques-
tion about “the minimal metaphysical supervenience base” of experiences, but 
rather an explanatory framework for interdisciplinary research – for example, 
for research in neuroscience on the neural correlates of consciousness. On this 
latter approach, an interesting question is the bioengineering task of keeping 
a brain alive and functioning in a vat, and of providing stimuli that match our 
environment. Thompson and Cosmelli investigate this question in some detail, 
and fi nd that the task is absolutely formidable, and the only way it could be done 
is to build something like a body for the brain and place it in an appropriate 
environment. They conclude: 
 In the range of possible situations relevant to the explanatory framework 
of the neuroscience of consciousness, the brain in a vat thought experi-
ment, strictly speaking, doesn’t seem possible (because the envatted 
brain turns out to be an embodied brain after all). 
 ( Cosmelli and Thompson 2011, 173) 
 The extended mind hypothesis (Section 3.3) is usually classifi ed together with, 
or even as one of the possible embodied views (Section 3.4), because of the 
apparent shared interest in the realization of cognitive processes (in other 
words, because of answering a how, rather than a what-question, to use Hur-
ley’s terminology). In fact, the motivations of the two views are rather different. 
The extended mind hypothesis, as explained above, is a consequence of the 
functionalist view that only functional roles matter and the nature of the physi-
cal realizer don’t. Clearly, Otto’s notebook could be replaced by a computer, by 
a tape recorder, by any kind of device that was capable of holding the abstract 
representations stored in Otto’s notebook. This is quite alien to the spirit of 
embodied views, which emphasize the dependence of cognition on the particu-
lar shape of our bodies and the on the contingent variation of sensory stimula-
tion with our interactions with the world. The two views are not incompatible, 
but, arguably, they limit each other’s scope. States that are especially suitable 
for extension tend to employ multiply realizable, abstract representations – so 
these states are not strongly embodied. In contrast, embodied processes that 
depend on a contingent bodily setup  are likely to resist extension (see also 
 Clark 2008, part III). 
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 4.2 Current state 
 Externalism, as defi ned in section 2, has become something like the orthodoxy 
in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind. Most philosophers who write on 
relevant topics are externalist at least about some mental features; that is, they 
hold that these features depend on factors external to a thinking subject. 14 Many 
are externalists about (at least some aspects of) content. Defenders of disjunctivist 
and relational views of perception are externalists about experiences. A further 
proposal which generated signifi cant interest and debate was Timothy William-
son’s claim that knowing is a state of mind ( Williamson 2000 ). Since on this view, 
an ordinary knowing subject and her ignorant brain-in-a-vat counterpart have dif-
ferent mental states, this is also a form of externalism. In recent years, there has 
been some revival of an internalist defense ( Farkas 2008 ;  Mendola 2008), but this 
position remains in the minority. 
 The extended mind hypothesis, as discussed in section 3.3, remains a contro-
versial thesis in philosophy, with committed defenders, committed opponents, 
and many agnostics. The fi ndings described in section 3.4 give strong support to 
the claim cognitive processes signifi cantly involve sensory input, motor output 
and interaction with the environment, so embodied cognitive science remains a 
robust research program. As we have seen in section 4.1 above, the focus of this 
program is often on empirical questions that go outside the usual disciplinary 
bounds of philosophy. But while the results strongly suggest that not all cogni-
tion is offl ine, abstract and representational, as  Margaret Wilson (2002) notes, the 
same phenomena do not show that  no cognition is performed in such a way. In his 
review of Varela, Thompson, and Rosch’s  Embodied Mind Daniel Dennett asked 
whether the enactive program was really revolutionary or rather a welcome shift 
in emphasis ( Dennett 1993, 122). Dennett thought it was too soon to answer the 
question in 1993, and it is not obvious that the matter has been settled since then. 
 Notes 
 1  I would like to thank Tim Crane, Amy Kind, Philip Walsh, and Jeff Yoshimi for valu-
able comments on an earlier draft. Research for this chapter was supported by the 
Hungarian Scientifi c Research Fund, grant no. OTKA K-112542. 
 2  Descartes’  Meditations are included in the second volume of his selected philosophical 
writings (Descartes 1984). 
 3  Frege’s most important writings, including “On Sinn and Bedeutung” (1892) and “The 
Thought” (1918) are collected in Beaney 1997. 
 4  Putnam notes in a foreword to Pessin and Goldberg 1996 that at the time of writing 
“The Meaning of “Meaning””, he was not sure what the Twin Earth story entailed with 
respect to the mind (as opposed to meanings). But subsequently, he was persuaded by 
Burge and John McDowell that mental states also depend on factors outside us. 
 5  For defense of the disjunctive theory of perception, see McDowell 1982, Martin 2004. 
John Campbell is not a disjunctivist, but he also defends a form of externalism about 
perceptual experiences as a response to the question of how we can possess an objec-
tive environment; see his contribution in Campbell and Cassam 2014. 
15031-1693d-1pass-r02.indd   275 07-04-2018   20:16:52
K AT A L I N  F A R K A S
276
 6  Brie Gertler (2012) assesses different detailed defi nitions of externalism, and con-
cludes that there is no univocal thesis of externalism and internalism. 
 7  Here is an illustration: at the time of writing this chapter in October 2014, there are 
around 1,500 entries in the  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , which is the most 
widely consulted internet reference work in analytic philosophy. Ninety-two of these 
entries (mostly on continental or feminist philosophy) refer to Freud, whereas, for 
example, Hilary Putnam is mentioned in 230 entries. The SEP entry on the “Philoso-
phy of Psychiatry” does not contain a single reference to Freud’s work. The term “psy-
choanalysis” is mentioned in 76 documents. In contrast, the number of documents that 
mention “cognitive science” is 175, “artifi cial intelligence” 119, “quantum mechanics” 
138. 
 8  This would be true for example of U. T. Place, J.J.C. Smart, and David Armstrong, 
who published infl uential work defending physicalism in the 1950s and 60s; see Place 
1956, Smart 1953 and Armstrong 1968. 
 9  I don’t have statistics on the philosophical views of scientists, but it is interesting 
to note that most Nobel Prize winners in the 20th century who did research on the 
brain expressed some view in writing on the mind body-problem, and, with one excep-
tion, they were not physicalists. Charles Scott Sherrington (Nobel Prize 1932) held a 
“double aspect” theory; John Eccles (Nobel Prize 1963) was a dualist, Gerald Edel-
man (Nobel Prize 1972) defended non-reductive biologism, and Roger Wolcott Sperry 
(Nobel Prize 1981) defended a type of emergentism. The exception is Francis Crick 
(Nobel Prize 1962), who was an ardent physicalist. 
 10  Classic defenses of an early version of functionalism can be found in Putnam 1960 and 
1967. 
 11  For various pros and cons in the debate, see the papers collected in Menary 2010. 
 12  For another development of the enactive conception, see Noë 2005. 
 13  For this type of criticism of the extended mind view, see also Adams and Aizawa 
(2010). 
 14  According to the 2009 survey conducted by PhilPapers, 51 percent of respondents 
accept or lean toward externalism, 20 percent accept or lean towards internalism, and 
29 percent indicated “Other”. However, we should note that many philosophers who 
accept dual content theories call themselves internalists, because they recognize some 
sort of narrow content in the contested cases. This hides the fact that they accept exter-
nalism about  some mental features. For example, David Chalmers and Terry Horgan, 
philosophers who argued for a robust notion of narrow content, both claim they accept 
internalism, even though they both think that there is also an aspect of mental content 
which is broad. Horgan makes this clear in a comment: “I hold that the most fundamen-
tal kind of mental content is internalist (and phenomenally constituted), but that some 
thought-constituents also have a form of intentionality that constitutively depends in 
part on internal/external linkages” (PhilPapers Survey). 
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